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Hegel, Retroactivity & The End 




While I am deeply in accord with the basic thrust of Todd McGowan’s reading 
of Hegel, inclusive of his project of a return from Marx to Hegel, in this short note I 
would like to focus on two minor points of disagreement. First, I cannot agree with 
his disqualification of a key statement by Hegel as “misleading”: 
 
If Hegel had access to Freud’s conception of the unconscious and the 
drives, he would have been able to formulate the appeal of 
contradiction more straightforwardly to both himself and his readers. He 
wouldn’t have used the misleading terms of the good and unity to 
describe the subject’s actions. He wouldn’t have said, near the end of 
the Encyclopedic Logic, “The good, the absolute good, brings itself to 
completion in the world eternally, and the result is that it is already 
brought to completion in and for itself, without needing first to wait for 
us.” Hegel has no conceptual apparatus to formulate how we seek out 
disturbances in the guise of success.1 
 
To make my reproach clear, let me first quote the whole paragraph from 
which McGowan took the phrase he disagrees with. In his “small” (Encyclopaedia) 
Logic, Hegel proposes his own version of la vérité surgit de la méprise, ambiguously 
asserting that “only from this error does the truth come forth”: 
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In the sphere of the finite we can neither experience nor see that the 
purpose is genuinely attained. The accomplishing of the infinite purpose 
consists therefore only in sublating the illusion that it has not yet been 
accomplished. The good, the absolute good, fulfills itself eternally in the 
world, and the result is that it is already fulfilled in and for itself, and does 
not need to wait upon us for this to happen. This is the illusion in which 
we live, and at the same time it is this illusion alone that is the activating 
element upon which our interest in the world rests. It is within its own 
process that the Idea produces that illusion for itself; it posits an other 
confronting itself, and its action consists in sublating that illusion. Only 
from this error does the truth come forth, and herein lies our 
reconciliation with error and with finitude. Otherness or error, as 
sublated, is itself a necessary moment of the truth, which can only be in 
that it makes itself into its own result.2 
 
In short, the ultimate deception is not to see that one already has what one is 
looking for, like Christ’s disciples who were awaiting his “real” reincarnation, blind to 
the fact that their collective already was the Holy Spirit, the return of the living Christ. 
For this reason, I think Hegel knows very well how to “seek out disturbances in the 
guise of success”; the problem is that he is ambiguous in how he formulates it. He 
can be read as asserting that the Absolute is playing with itself: it creates a 
disturbance (alienates itself from itself, gets involved in a struggle with itself), and 
enjoy playing with this disturbance. The whole life of the Absolute is to “seek out 
disturbances,” and Hegel knows very well that every success creates a new (self-
)division: when the enemy is defeated, the victor has to confront its own 
inconsistency… What is wrong in this reading is the presupposition of the same 
subject of the process: the self-identical “Absolute” which plays a game with itself. 
What gets lost here is the key fact that there is no self-identical subject which plays 
with itself in divisions: division comes first, it precedes what is divided, and the self-
identity which emerges in the course of this process is a form of (self-)division. 
Without this fact, we cannot understand properly the quoted passage from Hegel 
that McGowan dismisses as problematic. To put it in McGowan’s terms, if 
reconciliation is reconciliation with contradiction, this means precisely that, in some 
sense, reconciliation always-already happened – the illusion is that reconciliation did 
not already happen. This is what Hegel says in the quoted “problematic” passage, 
but here interpretive problems begin. If we read this passage in a simple and direct 
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way, it amounts to the strongest possible assertion of the Absolute as a self-sufficient 
Substance and not also a subject. In contrast to this reading, one should insist that 
the “problematic” passage is the only way to consistently formulate the idea of the 
Absolute not only as substance but also as subject. The solution is not to conceive 
the historical process as open, with everything depending on us, free subjects, and 
every objective determination a reified objectivization of our own creativity; it is also 
not a “balanced” combination of substantial fate and the limited space of free 
subjective creativity, in the sense of the famous lines from the beginning of Marx’s 
Eighteenth Brumaire: “Men make their own history, but they do not make it as they 
please; they do not make it under self-selected circumstances, but under 
circumstances existing already, given and transmitted from the past.”3 It is not that 
historical necessity provided the basic frame within which we can act freely (in the 
sense of Engels’ notion of historical necessity which realizes itself through a complex 
network of individual contingencies). There is Fate, our future is predetermined, the 
Absolute “is already brought to completion in and for itself, without needing first to 
wait for us,” but this very completion is our own contingent act. 
 In short, the paradox is that the only way to assert the possibility of a radical 
change through subjective intervention is to accept Predestination and Fate. 
Historical process is thus characterized by the overlapping of necessity and 
contingency, the overlapping which was first explicitly formulated in the Protestant 
idea of predestination. It’s not that a deeper necessity realizes itself through a 
complex set of contingent circumstances, it’s that contingent circumstances decide 
the fate of necessity itself: once a thing (contingently) happens, its occurrence 
retroactively becomes necessary. Our fate is yet not decided – not in the simple 
sense that we have a choice, but in a more radical sense of choosing one’s fate itself.  
According to the standard view, the past is fixed, what happened happened, it 
cannot be undone, and the future is open, it depends on unpredictable 
contingencies. What we should propose here is a reversal of this standard view: the 
past is open to retroactive reinterpretations, while the future is closed since we live in 
a determinist universe. This doesn’t mean that we cannot change the future; it just 
means that, in order to change our future, we should first (not “understand” but) 
change our past, reinterpret it in such a way that opens up towards a different future 
from the one implied by the predominant vision of the past. Will there be a new world 
war? The answer can only be a paradoxical one: IF there will be a new war, it will be 
a necessary one. This is how history works – through weird reversals described by 
Jean-Pierre Dupuy: “if an outstanding event takes place, a catastrophe, for example, 
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it could not not have taken place; nonetheless, insofar as it did not take place, it is not 
inevitable. It is thus the event’s actualization – the fact that it takes place – which 
retroactively creates its necessity.”4 With regard to the new global war: once the 
conflict will explode (between the US and Iran, between China and Taiwan…), it will 
appear necessary, that is to say, we will automatically read the past that led to it as a 
series of causes that necessarily caused the explosion. If it will not happen, we will 
read it the way we today read the Cold War: as a series of dangerous moments 
where the catastrophe was avoided because both sides were aware of the deadly 
consequences of a global conflict. (So, we have today many interpreters who claim 
that there never was an actual danger of a World War III during the Cold War, that 
both sides were just playing with fire.) In the time of the project, counterfactually thus 
plays a key role: 
 
The future is taken as counterfactually independent from the past 
(although at the same time it depends or can depend on the past 
causally); the past is taken as counterfactually depending on the future 
(although it necessarily does not depend on it causally). The future is 
fixed, the past is open.5  
 
How, precisely, can the past be changed counterfactually? Here, differentiality 
enters again. Recall our example from Ninotchka of the cup of coffee: we cannot 
change the content of a past cup of plain coffee, but we can change its differential 
status from “coffee without cream” to “coffee without milk.” This mediation of every 
positive existence is the stuff of “spirit,” of its negativity threatened by the prospect of 
Singularity. So does, in the same way, with the rise of post-humanity, humanity 
become immanently a “not-yet-Singularity”? 
 One should be precise here: “what one anticipates as the fixed point in the 
future is the future which will realize itself if one did not anticipate it, or if one did not 
react to its anticipation the way we reacted to it trying to prevent it.”6 The contrast is 
clear here with the case of Oedipus, in which the future (the destiny foretold to 
Oedipus’ father) realizes itself through the very fact that it was anticipated (told to the 
father) and that the father reacted to this by way of trying to avoid it (leaving the small 
Oedipus in a forest, expecting that he will die there) – without its anticipation, fate 
would not actualize itself. 
 To recapitulate, if, in the traditional view, the past is determined and the future 
open (depending on our choice), what characterizes the future is a disjunction: the 
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future will be A or B, depending on our (free, not predetermined) choice. In the “time 
of the project,” there are no alternative futures because the future is necessary; 
however, by changing the past we can nonetheless constitute a different necessity 
and thus bring about a different future – the two (or more) options are here not 
bifurcated but superposed, like different states in quantum physics. This temporality 
thus enables us to assert “the indeterminacy of the future in a conception of time 
which make the future a necessary one”: 
 
Insofar as the future is not rendered present, one has to think it as 
simultaneously inclusive of the catastrophic event and of its not-taking-
place – not as disjunctive possibilities but as a conjunction of states one 
or the other of which will reveal itself a posteriori as necessary the 
moment the present will choose it.7 
 
While, back in the years of the Cold War, the prospect of an apocalypse was almost 
exclusively focused on the possibility of global nuclear war, today there are many 
versions of an apocalyptic event that haunt us: nuclear war again (the US versus Iran 
or North Korea), but also the prospect of a global ecological catastrophe. (At least 
two other apocalyptic events are also easily imaginable: a financial-economic 
meltdown, and a digital apocalypse, i.e., the collapse of the digital network that 
regulates and sustains our lives). 
 The “fixed point” in the future around which the time of the project executes its 
circular movement (counterfactually changing the past and thereby the causality that 
will – or will not – generate the apocalypse) can assume different forms of 
(non)desirability. In the logic of MAD and doomsday prophecies, as well as in 
ecological doomsday discourse, it is a negative one (we fixate on it in order to 
postpone/avoid it), while in Communism it is a positive one (we evoke it to struggle 
for it).8 So how does the Hegelian contradiction work here? Here is another passage 
from McGowan: 
 
 In the act of grasping the symbolic structure absolutely, as an ultimate 
horizon for thought, we can illuminate the contradiction that marks the 
point of the structure’s internal vulnerability. This at once creates the 
possibility for change and indicates that no change, no matter how 
revolutionary, will ever heal the wound of the social order. A society can 
move beyond a specific contradiction, but it will necessarily encounter 
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another one. This is not a recipe for quietism but a call to act. The point 
of political contestation is to  
move in the direction of an increasingly resistant contradiction, and 
philosophy plays a vital role in this movement. This is Hegel’s definition 
of progress: the movement from more easily resolved social 
contradictions to more intractable ones.9 
 
How to reply here to the obvious reaction: why is the fact that, when we 
overcome one contradiction, we necessarily encounter another one, “not a recipe for 
quietism but a call to act”? Vulgari eloquentia, if, by flushing the toilet in order to get 
rid of one contradiction, you get the same shit back in an even more intractable form, 
why fight at all? Why not remain within the old contradiction (say, capitalism), just 
trying to render it a little bit more bearable? To put it in a slightly different way, it is too 
easy to claim that reconciliation means reconciliation with contradiction, and that all 
evil comes from avoiding contradictions (i.e., to turn around the standard perspective 
and claim that totalitarianism comes from trying to leave contradictions behind).10 
One should be more specific here: “progress” is the move from (external) antagonism 
(we against the enemy) to immanent (self-)contradiction. So, it’s not a Maoist 
celebration of eternal struggle with the enemy but an admission of the fact that, even 
after you (eventually) destroy your enemy, the new situation will continue to be a self-
contradictory one. (But it is even too much to say that the denial of self-contradiction 
generates the figure of Enemy: Hitler was a true enemy, he had to be fought and 
destroyed, but it would be ridiculous to claim that the progressive forces fighting him 
were wrong to externalize their inner contradiction into the external figure of an 
Enemy.) This brings us to another problematic topic of Hegel’s thought: the end of 
history.  
 Historicizing his own position remains a problem for Hegel – it is as if he lacks 
the proper terms to formulate it. While he insists on the closure of Absolute Knowing, 
he often adds a weird temporal qualification: “for the time being,” or something 
similar. So how is Absolute Knowing historicized? Can Hegel think the historical 
limitation of his own position? In some sense, the answer is no, of course: 
historicization of one’s own position implies that we can somehow step on our 
shoulders and look at ourselves from the outside, so that we can see our own 
relativity, so Absolute Knowing is the necessary consequence of radical self-
historicization. However, to put it in a brutally naïve way: does Hegel’s Logic really 
provide the definitive (and in this sense ahistorical) matrix of all possible modes of 
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rationality? Does quantum physics not require a set of categories not found in 
Hegel? So what should we do today, just continue relying on the structure of Hegel’s 
logic or rewrite it, introducing new categories? In a critical stab at my position on this 
topic, McGowan writes that Hegel’s claim about the end of history 
 
 …is stronger than an admission that the end of history constantly 
imposes itself on us as historical subjects. Instead, Hegel believes we 
will never move beyond the recognition that all are free, which is the 
recognition that occurs in modern Europe (as well as in North America 
and Haiti). This does not mean that significant historical events will 
cease or that no new avenues for the articulation of freedom will be 
discovered – like some new form of 
 communism, for instance. But, for Hegel, history as a field for the 
unfolding of new insights into existence reaches its conclusion with the 
recognition of universal freedom, which occurs with the development of 
modernity and the French Revolution.11 
 
But is the assertion of universal freedom in modernity really a break that “no 
subsequent event can ever top”?12 One can argue that it is rather the middle term in 
the triad of Christianity, modern political freedom and what Communism envisages 
as social freedom. We begin with the inner spiritual liberation (we are all equal in 
Christ), we pass to political liberation (freedom in the political public space), and after 
that, the prospect of a social liberation opens up. In spite of all that is problematic in 
Marx’s dealing with freedom, he made a valuable point with his claim that the market 
economy combines in a unique way political and personal freedom with social 
unfreedom: personal freedom (freely selling myself on the market) is the very form of 
my unfreedom. This does not mean that political freedom is just a bourgeois illusion 
masking the reality of exploitation and servitude – the problem is much more serious. 
While, in a market economy, I remain de facto dependent, this dependency is 
nonetheless “civilized,” enacted in the form of a “free” market exchange between me 
and other persons instead of the form of direct servitude or even physical coercion. It 
is easy to ridicule Ayn Rand, but there is a grain of truth in the famous “hymn to 
money” from her Atlas Shrugged: “Until and unless you discover that money is the 
root of all good, you ask for your own destruction. When money ceases to become 
the means by which men deal with one another, then men become the tools of other 
men. Blood, whips and guns or dollars. Take your choice – there is no other.”13 Did 
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Marx not say something similar in his well-known formula of how, in the universe of 
commodities, “relations between people assume the guise of relations among 
things”? In the market economy, relations between people can appear as relations of 
mutually recognized freedom and equality: domination is no longer directly enacted 
and visible as such. Really-existing Socialism in the twentieth century proved that the 
overcoming of the market-alienation abolishes “alienated” freedom and with it 
freedom tout court, bringing us back to “non-alienated” relations of direct domination. 
How to imagine a communal space without a regulating agency which controls the 
very medium of collaboration and thereby exerts direct domination? It is thus clear 
that that a “Communist” society would involve new “contradictions” – can we surmise 
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